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Abstract 
Over the past years, parties often described as populist, such as SYRIZA in Greece, the Five 
Star Movement (FSM) in Italy and Podemos in Spain have made significant electoral 
breakthroughs, unsettling well-established party systems. In the literature, inclusionary 
populism has primarily been applied to Latin America whereas the three South European 
parties have been examined individually, but not in comparative perspective. The purpose of 
this article is to provide a comparative analysis, based on an original electoral manifestos 
content analysis, aimed at unveiling the ‘inclusionary populism’ features of the ‘new’ 
political parties that have emerged in Southern Europe. By focusing on the 2012–17 period, 
the article shows that the inclusionary category can be fruitfully applied also to European 
political parties; it finds different degrees of inclusionary populism (namely between 
SYRIZA and Podemos); and it proves that the FSM falls between the two exclusionary vs. 
inclusionary poles.  
Keywords: inclusionary populism; Southern Europe; SYRIZA; Podemos; Five Star 
Movement 
 
According to Richard Katz and Peter Mair’s (1995) ‘cartel party’ thesis, post-industrial 
economic transformation and technological advances have led to a shift of European political 
parties away from their representative function. The mediatization of politics, the decline of 
party membership (van Biezen et al. 2012) and the loosening of ties between parties and their 
affiliated organizations (Bale and Allen 2011) have resulted in the erosion of parties’ 
institutional milieux to a significant extent. In response, political discontent with political 
parties has risen, as expressed in declining levels of institutional trust, the rise of anti-party 
sentiments (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996) and the emergence of populist attitudes in voters 
(Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2013) and social movements as alternative political actors 
(Mudde 2004). Against the background of widespread popular discontent with mainstream 
political parties, adopting a populist discourse and mobilization strategy favours parties that 
are excluded from the ‘cartel’ and aim to challenge it from the outside. It is hence no surprise 
that Europe is witnessing the emergence of populist political actors whose discourse is of the 
people and whose declared aim is to break the mould. 
 
While these long-term structural factors prepared the ground for the emergence of populist 
parties in Europe, it was contingent factors such as the Great Recession that contributed to 
bolstering their electoral success. In Southern Europe, the intensity of the economic crisis 
placed European political systems under strain by exacerbating the perception of inefficiency, 
widespread corruption and programmatic collusion of the mainstream parties that comprise the 
‘cartel’, thus increasing political discontent (Salgado and Stavrakakis 2018). In Northern 
Europe, where the effects of the economic crisis were not as profound as in the South, the 
opportunity to capitalize on popular concerns generated by calls for pan-European 
redistributive policies and trans-European migration was seized by populist political 
entrepreneurs, who attacked mainstream political parties for putting the interests of ‘foreigners’ 
before those of the native population. Populist parties have hence emerged as serious 
contenders for power across the continent after the crisis, challenging established party systems 
(Verney and Bosco 2013; Kriesi 2014).  
 
In order to disentangle the populist crowded and somewhat dissonant world, scholars have 
distinguished between exclusionary and inclusionary populist parties (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2013). Whereas exclusionary populism has been largely investigated, inclusionary 
populism in Europe is a recent phenomenon that has not yet been sufficiently explored either 
in theoretical or empirical terms in comparative perspective. Hence, our main research 
questions: Does the inclusionary populist category accurately capture recent developments in 
Europe’s South?  If so, what are the differences between inclusionary populist discourses? In 
this study we are primarily interested in testing the heuristic validity of binary classifications 
of populism such as the inclusionary–exclusionary classification and, more specifically, 
exploring the possibility that the differences between populisms may be better captured not via 
dichotomous approaches but rather gradational ones (Graziano and Caiani 2016). Further, the 
article explores whether inclusionary populist parties in Southern Europe reflect Cas Mudde’s 
(2004) homogeneous representation of ‘the people’.1 
 
Our study focuses on a comparison of the three most electorally successful populist contender 
parties in the Southern Europe over the post-crisis period: SYRIZA, the Five Star Movement 
(FSM) and Podemos. The main goal is exploratory: drawing on insights from the in-depth 
comparative exploration of the three case studies we aim to develop a sophisticated 
understanding of the concept of inclusionary populism in the European context. Our ambition 
is to set the groundwork and generate insights that will inform larger comparative studies of 
the inclusionary populist phenomenon.  
 
The article is structured as follows. The first section presents the theoretical debates in which 
the article is grounded and the main questions addressed in the study. This is followed by the 
description of the data and methods employed in the comparative analysis. The subsequent 
three sections deal with the new populist contenders of Southern Europe. The section that 
follows analyses the results from a comparative perspective. The article concludes with a 
discussion of the main findings and a reflection on further research on inclusionary populism 
in Southern Europe and beyond. 
 
 
The analytical framework: exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism 
Populism is widely understood as an ideology, albeit a ‘thin-centred’ ideology (Mudde 2004) 
because its core can be combined with other ideologies such as liberalism or communism. A 
variation on the understanding of populism as a ‘thin ideology’ is populism as a style or 
discourse of politics – that is, not expressing core beliefs but a mode of political expression 
employed strategically by its proponents (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Mudde’s well-established 
minimal definition of populism is that of ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt 
elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general 
will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543).  
Mudde’s definition has recently been challenged on the grounds that populists do not deploy a 
‘homogeneous’ conception of the people (Stavrakakis and Jaeger 2018, Stavrakais et al 2017, 
de Cleen et al 2018, Katsambekis 2016). Rather, it is argued, populists are actively engaged in 
constructing their ‘people’, by appealing to a wide array of groups, interests and identities, 
brought together in what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001) term ‘a chain of 
equivalence’ (de Cleen 2017: 349). This article concurs and builds on these objections by 
exploring the discursive politics that populists regularly engage in which involve the inclusion 
or exclusion of particular social groups and identities (outgroups) into/from ‘the people’. We 
expect that the strategic choices populist actors make in this respect are vital when it comes to 
identifying the type of populism with which they can most closely be identified.  
Comparative studies of populism have drawn a key distinction between inclusionary and 
exclusionary populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). a distinction which is based on 
three analytical dimensions originally applied to the analysis of the Israeli populist right: 
material, political and symbolic (Filc 2010: 128-138). The material dimension concerns the 
distribution of resources among social groups, with inclusionary populist parties in favour of 
mass welfare programmes to include the poor, and exclusionary populisms defending forms of 
welfare chauvinism that aim to protect established welfare insiders from immigrant outsiders. 
The political dimension refers to forms of political mobilization that go beyond representative 
democratic channels such as plebiscitary and local forms of radical democracy. Inclusionary 
populisms mean for these mechanisms to give a voice to disregarded groups while exclusionary 
populisms advocate similar devices but demand the disenfranchisement of immigrant groups. 
Finally, the symbolic dimension involves setting the boundaries of ‘the people’, with 
inclusionary movements highlighting, for instance, the ‘dignity’ of indigenous populations, 
while symbolic exclusion often draws on forms of cultural discrimination. In what follows we 
will adopt this analytical distinction, applying it to three largely successful populist parties in 
Southern Europe. 
 
While exclusionary populism in Europe is associated with the far right, anti-immigration 
parties that have emerged or evolved since the 1980s (Kitschelt 1997; Norris 2005), 
inclusionary populism can be primarily associated with social democratic parties, as well as 
with parties of the radical left, beyond social democracy (Mouffe 2018). ‘Left’ is here 
understood as egalitarian, anti-capitalist and internationalist (March 2011). This type of 
populism is new to Europe’s radical left politics (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Luke 
March and Cas Mudde (2005) spoke of an ideological ‘mutation’ in the radical left party family 
in Europe that was leading parts of it to shift away from traditional Marxist-Leninist class 
analysis towards the emergence of a new left ‘social-populism’ (see also March 2011). It might 
prima facie be expected that inclusionary and exclusionary populisms overlap, respectively, 
with left and right populisms, or rather, that the inclusionary-exclusionary distinction can be 
subjugated to the left–right distinction when it comes to populist parties. While this expectation 
is reasonable, we do not make it our starting point in this study. Our concern is that an 
increasing number of populist parties self-identify as ‘beyond’ conventional (left–right) party 
politics while adopting a wide range of positions on the question of inclusion and exclusion. 
Under such circumstances we would argue that starting from the inclusionary–exclusionary 
distinction potentially carries greater explanatory strength than starting from the left–right 
distinction when it comes to classifying (South European) populisms. 
Put differently, left and right are increasingly difficult to capture analytically, and the relatively 
novel distinction between ‘exclusionary’ and ‘inclusionary’ seems to be more in line with 
current political discourses and more in line with operationalization concerns when focusing 
on party manifestos. This does not imply that the difference is always straightforward, but 
rather that basing the distinction on three clear analytical dimensions allows a better 
understanding of the differences among different types of populist parties.   
 
 
Data and methods 
This study’s primary task is to investigate whether and to what extent the discourses of the 
three most successful new parties in Southern European politics commonly portrayed as 
populist  – SYRIZA, the FSM and Podemos – are inclusionary in nature. We selected these 
parties according to the following criteria. First, studies analysing the emergence of these 
parties commonly find that they display populist features (Kioupkiolis, 2016, Kriesi et al., 
2015; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018; Ramiro and Gómez, 2017). Second, all three parties have 
experienced rapid electoral success and challenged and transformed their respective party 
systems. Finally, regardless of the fact that some party leaders have avoided identifying with 
left or right, expert surveys have identified these parties’ ideological positions as traditional 
left/centre-left. In particular, the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey indicates that they hold 
left/centre-left ideological positions (SYRIZA = 2; FSM = 4.67 and Podemos = 1.67), on a 0 
to 10 scale on the left–right axis (Polk et al., 2017). By comparing cases of parties labelled as 
populist, keeping the geographical region, the position in the party system and the estimated 
party positioning relatively constant, we are in a good position to characterize where these 
parties stand with regards to inclusionary populism. 
The study combines quantitative text analysis of party manifestos with qualitative content 
analysis of manifestos and speeches, covering the 2012–16 period. The advantages of 
combining quantitative and qualitative text analysis in the study of populism have already been 
signalled in the literature on populism (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011). Our approach involves 
a two-step process.  
In the first stage, we relied on a dictionary-based analysis of party manifestos to perform word 
counts. Word counts served to detect inclusionary elements in party manifestos and measure 
the extent to which manifestos attach importance to the inclusion of groups in society that 
suffer discrimination in the context of welfare schemes, political rights and group identity 
(outgroups). In this initial stage, automated content analysis would allow us to measure 
inclusionary populism, yielding exact and highly reliable results (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 
2011). The automated text analysis focused on electoral programmes as they are formal 
documents that include policy preferences and facilitate a reliable comparison. While analysing 
manifestos is sometimes considered to be insufficient to measure the degree of populism 
because, arguably, it does not capture well the people/elite dichotomy, it is important to 
highlight that this study does not purport to address this dichotomy but to conduct a systematic 
analysis of inclusionary elements in populist party discourses. We combine national and 
European party manifestos (see online Appendix C).2 The former refer to the most important 
electoral events in parliamentary systems which allow citizens to elect their representatives in 
national assemblies and ultimately select their government. The analysis of the latter allows us 
to identify variations between the three parties in a single election.3 
Partly based on Matthijs Rooduijn and Teun Pauwels’s (2011) methodological approach, we 
generated a dictionary of inclusionary terms based on both theoretical and empirical criteria. 
Drawing closely on Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira-Kaltwasser’s (2013) theoretical 
framework, we selected a limited range of words referring to key social groups (outgroups) 
that we would expect to see highlighted as worthy of inclusion in party discourses as well as 
terms related to principles, policies or procedures that would best reflect the three dimensions 
of the concept of inclusionary populism. The initial selection of terms contained words 
referring to such outgroups as well as to principles or policies aiming at improving the 
distribution of economic resources and welfare policies (material dimension), to institutional 
mechanisms and core principles that enhance outgroups’ representation and political 
participation in the political system (political dimension), and to the idea of dignity and 
affirmation with the vocation of expanding the boundaries of the common identity (symbolic 
dimension). Table 1 includes the key features of inclusionary and exclusionary populism, on 
which the selection of terms is based. Once the terms were selected, we checked that the words 
appeared in the manifestos. Complementarily, we performed an empirically based selection of 
terms by adding context-specific words identified in the respective manifestos (Rooduijn and 
Pauwels 2011), for instance the Spanish word dependientes or the Greek term ΑΜΕΑ. 
 
Table 1. Main features of inclusionary and exclusionary populism 
Type of 
populism/dimension 
involved 
Inclusionary  Exclusionary 
Material Welfare expansion Welfare chauvinism 
Political Universal participation 
expansion 
Selective participation 
expansion 
Symbolic People/community 
(encompassing definition) 
People/community 
(restricted definition) 
Source: Own elaboration based on Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013. 
 
The dictionary was initially elaborated in English and then translated into original languages, 
whereas context-specific terms were subsequently added in original languages. Word counts 
were performed automatically for FSM and Podemos manifestos in their original languages, 
and manually for SYRIZA manifestos in Greek and, as a double check, automatically on an 
own English translation.4 As we know from previous automated text analysis, dictionary-based 
analyses represent text as data and perform word counts to measure the extent to which 
documents belong to a particular category (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Laver et al. 2003; 
Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Slapin and Proksch, 2008). We relied on this 
technique to measure the presence of each term in an accurate way, thus securing high levels 
of reliability (Aslanidis 2018, Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). However, automated text analysis 
also raises validity concerns (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011, Bonikowski and Gidron 2016, 
Grimmer and Stewart 2013). We took several validation steps.  
To validate the dictionary and be confident that our measurement captures the concept under 
study (Adcock and Collier, 2001; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011), we manually checked the 
outcome of a first trial of the computerized analysis to eliminate the ambiguity problems often 
associated with word count approaches (Laver et al., 2003). Given that words may have 
different meanings in different languages and cultures, and that this might affect the results in 
a comparative analysis, we first checked that the majority of keywords contained in the 
dictionary – for example. δημοκρατία, democrazia, democracia – share a core fundamental 
meaning across languages. Then, following a standard practice with automated text analysis, 
we exhaustively read the manifestos and identified whether each of the words encountered in 
the analysis had a univocal meaning and proceeded to remove false positives (Bonikowski and 
Gidron, 2016). For instance, we only included the term ‘community’ when it referred to the 
idea of belonging to a group and discarded it when referred to the European Union (European 
Community). Likewise, the keyword ‘culture’ was removed when it referred to cultural policy 
rather to the notion of cultural identity. For similar reasons, the term ‘nation’ was maintained 
for the FSM but removed for SYRIZA and Podemos: for the latter, it is commonly used as a 
synonym for state-wide (e.g. national healthcare system) and not referring to the notion of 
national identity or community.  The terms contained in the dictionary are reported in the online 
Appendix B. 
In order that we could be confident about the content validity of our analysis, we manually 
verified whether or not each of the associations between references to key outgroups and 
references to the dominant frames of each of the three dimensions of populism identified 
through the quantitative analysis expressed an inclusionary idea. For instance, we checked 
whether manifestos promote the involvement of immigrants in the welfare system, institutional 
participative arrangements and group identity, or otherwise.  
It must be noted that manifestos vary considerably in size, with those of Podemos being much 
longer than those of SYRIZA and the FSM. While variations in text length may reflect 
differences in the degree of detail of policy proposals, we do not assume that size differences 
involve differences in the degree of inclusionary populism.5  That said, given that percentages 
for each keyword would be lower in longer, more detailed manifestos, and that this could lead 
us to misleading interpretations, the results are expressed both in relative and absolute numbers 
in online Appendix C. 
The automated text analysis was complemented with a qualitative content analysis. We 
manually examined party manifestos to complement the findings of the computerized analysis. 
Key inclusionary ideas contained in manifestos – or the absence of them – were detected and 
are reported in the empirical section. Finally, the analysis of manifestos was triangulated with 
a qualitative content analysis of key speeches by party leaders. This served to nuance and better 
qualify the nature of the associations between outgroups and the three dimensions of 
inclusionary populism. The sample of speeches was selected based on several criteria. First, 
we selected speeches that are politically relevant for parties themselves, taking into account 
that they express in relative detail the ideological basis of the party and constitute landmarks 
in the history of party discourse. More specifically, we selected speeches which were given in 
highly symbolic (such as the New Year’s Eve speech by Beppe Grillo) or institutional moments 
(such as the speech for the election of the president of the European Parliament by Pablo 
Iglesias). By selecting such politically relevant speeches, we could be more confident that they 
are globally representative of the party discourse – at least in the period under scrutiny (2012–
16). Searches in parties’ websites as well as additional documentary material served to identify 
relevant speeches. Second, we only selected speeches made by each of the main party leaders  
– Alexis Tsipras (SYRIZA), Beppe Grillo (FSM) and Pablo Iglesias (Podemos) – as they are 
in the best position to reflect their respective party discourse. Finally, the speeches selected (12 
in total), were given during the period covered in this study – 2012–16 (see online Appendix 
D). In the empirical section, short fragments of speeches are included to qualitatively illustrate 
our findings. 
 
Empirical results 
SYRIZA 
SYRIZA was established in 2004 as an electoral and political coalition that brought together 
Synaspismos, a small party of democratic socialism of Eurocommunist heritage, and a number 
of other much smaller groups of the extra-parliamentary left of Maoist, Trotskyist, communist, 
ecologist, socialist and left social democratic origins. The coalition transformed itself into a 
unified political party immediately after the May 2012 national elections in Greece (Tsakatika 
and Eleftheriou 2013). In the midst of the complete overhaul of the political system that the 
economic crisis triggered in Greece, SYRIZA has been the main protagonist. Within the space 
of six years, SYRIZA went from being a minor party of the opposition barely crossing the 3% 
nationwide threshold required for parliamentary representation in the 2009 elections, to 
become a main party of government in the elections of January 2015 (online Appendix B). 
 
SYRIZA’s electoral success can be associated with its populist transformation, a relatively new 
development in the evolution of the party (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014: 127). SYRIZA’s 
populist discourse was not constitutive of its founding in 2004. Rather, it emerged as a 
prominent feature of the party’s appeal during the socially and politically tumultuous period 
between 2010 – when the first ‘bailout’ agreement (and associated Memorandum of 
Understanding) was signed with Greece’s creditors – and 2012, when the dual elections of May 
and June reordered Greek politics, elevating SYRIZA to the main opposition party. This was a 
time when SYRIZA tried to broaden its electoral appeal by attempting to voice the claims of 
emerging social movements such as the Indignados and ‘Can’t Pay, Won’t Pay’, among others, 
as well as by directly addressing disaffected voters who were distancing themselves primarily 
from PASOK, the main social democratic party. We will take SYRIZA’s ‘populist phase’, 
analysed in this study, to extend at least until 2015 when the party won national elections twice, 
securing its electoral gains and its presence in government (Tsakatika 2016).  
 
The main task in this section is to explore where SYRIZA’s populism stands with regard to the 
distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism, focusing on the 2012–15 period. 
We can see clearly in online Appendix C that SYRIZA explicitly and systematically refers to 
workers, women, the unemployed, the young, immigrants and the poor as outgroups. Further, 
it is clear that ‘welfare’ and ‘rights’ are the words most frequently used in SYRIZA’s 
manifestos with regard to the material dimension, ‘democracy’ and ‘protest’ are most used with 
regard to the political dimension while ‘the people’ (often referred to as ‘our people’) is most 
commonly used as a reference point in terms of the symbolic dimension (online Appendix C).  
 
A qualitative analysis of the manifestos is subsequently conducted, the aim of which is to 
identify associations between references to key outgroups and references to the dominant 
frames of each of the dimensions of populism identified through the quantitative analysis. We 
corroborate the data collected from the study of the manifestos with evidence from significant 
speeches by the party leader in order to clarify further the nature of those associations.  
 
With regard to the material dimension, building a modern, universal welfare state and 
an economy where worker control and participation in economic decisions are central 
priorities in SYRIZA’s manifestos. Labour rights, universal public provision of health 
and education accessible to all and special provisions to extend such provision to 
vulnerable groups such as immigrants, older people, disabled people and poorer people 
feature prominently. Describing SYRIZA’s vision for a ‘New Greece’, Tsipras 
demands ‘that everyone has the right to a minimum guaranteed dignified income. That 
everyone has access to dignified health care in public hospitals. That all retirees have a 
dignified pension and a minimum of care and social protection. That no child goes to 
school hungry’ (Tsipras 2012b).  
 
An inclusionary discourse is used each time reference is made to outgroups with welfare and 
rights. For Tsipras, SYRIZA’s victory would be a victory for all those excluded from social 
protection: ‘For each unemployed person, every person in despair, every hungry child, every 
patient who is experiencing the callousness of the inhuman State. For each retired person dying 
a slow death, every young person who seeks a new life in emigration, every citizen who sees 
his homeland bleed’ (Tsipras 2014a). 
 
In his speech presenting the candidates for the 2014 election, Tsipras makes a special appeal 
to the young: ‘I want to address in particular the young. […] Fight the system that wants you 
without rights. Without hope. Without wages and insurance. Without education and health’ 
(Tsipras 2014b). In the case of immigrants/refugees there is a clear argument for policies to 
treat them ‘humanely’, as well as policies of inclusion in terms of ‘equal political and social 
rights’. 
 
Coming to the political dimension, while ‘democracy’ is the term most often used, 
references to participative, plebiscitary or other direct forms of democracy –  often 
characteristic of inclusionary populist parties’ discourses – are hardly mentioned in 
SYRIZA’s manifestos. However, under the ‘protest’ category there are frequent 
mentions of ‘the Movement’ and of ‘the movements’ (online Appendix C) in the 2014 
European election manifesto. The implication is that movements are alternative (non-
institutionalized) channels through which citizens participate more directly in the 
political process, and this is a channel that SYRIZA encourages and adopts. There is 
no specific mention of excluding specific groups from either direct democratic or 
representative forms of political participation. On the contrary, there are several 
references to improving female political representation and all of the key outgroups are 
urged to become active political participants. For instance, in a speech given in the most 
populous working-class neighbourhood of Athens, Peristeri, in January 2012, Tsipras 
mentions:  ‘None of them (the government, the Troika) is going to care about the life 
and the dignity of the workers, the unemployed, the pensioners, the young. None of 
them will care about our rights. We ourselves, are the only ones who can and who must 
defend them through social struggles’ (Tsipras 2012a).  
 
Coming to the symbolic dimension, the most frequent category is by far that related to ‘the 
people’, from which none of the outgroups are excluded. The construction of community 
primarily in national terms (where the community is referred to as ‘the people’, what is implied 
is ‘the Greek people’) does not entail the exclusion of immigrants. Rather, integration in the 
community is the preferred path. Characteristically, SYRIZA actively promoted the extension 
of citizenship rights to immigrants. In his maiden speech to parliament as prime minister, 
Tsipras announced a new immigration policy whose aim would be ‘integration, protection, 
respect for human rights and the strengthening of social cohesion’ (Tsipras 2015). In particular, 
one of the immediate priorities of the first SYRIZA government in February 2015 was to 
legislate on granting Greek citizenship rights to second-generation immigrants, people born in 
Greece of immigrant parents, who had been until then excluded from consideration and often 
lacked any formal citizenship. Criticizing the absence of a legal framework for granting Greek 
citizenship rights to second generation immigrants Tsipras condemned the exclusion of: ‘The 
most integrated section of immigrants, those young people who have linked their life and their 
education with our country, those young people who have learned no other language, have no 
other homeland and have only received a Greek education’ (Tsipras 2015). 
 
To summarize, SYRIZA’s populism is clearly egalitarian and inclusionary. The party’s aim is 
to include key outgroups such as workers, women, the unemployed, the poor, the young and 
immigrants in the development of a universal welfare state, in the formal extension of (and the 
substantive empowerment to use) political rights and in the community. 
 
  
The Five Star Movement 
Today the FSM is a well-established phenomenon in the Italian political landscape, especially 
after the 2018 elections. In the 2013 national elections, the European political world realized 
that Grillo’s FSM (Beppe Grillo, as may be well known, is a former comedian and founder of 
the movement) was a new political entity which represented roughly over one-quarter of Italian 
voters (see online Appendix B). These results made the FSM the winner of the elections. A 
year later, at the European elections, the results were still quite positive, although only one 
voter out of five voted for the FSM. 
 
The FSM quickly emerged as a new political actor gaining visibility in the 2012 local elections. 
The ‘movement’ – which has turned into a very loosely organized party – has its roots in Beppe 
Grillo’s blog created in 2005 and, more generally, Grillo’s career as a comedian who since the 
mid-1990s produced shows which were increasingly politically engaged. But what kind of a 
movement/party is the one created by Grillo? Currently, there is a general consensus among 
Italian scholars in considering Grillo’s movement as a populist one (among others, Lanzone 
and Woods 2015). Grillo himself comes to term with the definition of populism and states quite 
clearly, in a post (which is the main form of communication of the FSM) that: ‘the FSM is not 
a rightist nor a leftist phenomenon, it’s on the side of the citizens. Proudly populist’ (Grillo 
2013). 
 
The results of our quantitative analysis show that in respect of outgroups, the FSM makes 
reference to very general notions of ‘nation’ (i.e. nationals), community (members), persons, 
people, youth, Italians and representatives of the agricultural world. Unlike the other political 
actors studied in this article, no reference is made to workers, women or immigrants. The only 
specific outgroup identified is represented by young people.  
  
In terms of the material dimension, both manifestos are very limited in terms of their proposals. 
With the exception of a ‘guaranteed unemployment benefit’, redistributive issues are virtually 
absent. The main material focus is against banks, against monopolies, in favour of local 
producers, public administration cost containment proposals (such as the reduction of public 
managers’ salaries) and a number of proposals regarding companies indexed in the stock 
exchange. Therefore, with respect to the other cases there is no direct reference to ‘equality’, 
‘rights’ or ‘welfare’ – either in inclusionary, or in exclusionary terms. 
 
With regard to the political dimensions, the FSM identifies political enemies rather than 
principles of political intervention. The political situation within the European Union is seen 
as a ‘war’ between an economic ‘oligarchy’ which follows a (German-based) doctrine based 
on a ‘virtual’ reality which does not consider the ‘rights’ of European citizens and the rest of 
the population. The abolition of the Fiscal Compact is the key target, and in terms of whether 
to remain in the euro or not the decision is left to an unspecified ‘consultation’ among citizens. 
The specific ‘protest’ feature is particularly evident in the political dimension since there are 
no shared political principles. In other words, the political goals are all defined in antagonistic 
terms, with the limited exception of the creation of a Mediterranean alliance aimed at creating 
an undefined common policy ‘against’ the financial oligarchy. In terms of the participation 
element, there is only some reference to the above-mentioned ‘consultation’ procedures which, 
if combined to the abundant use of the internet supported in other documents and practices 
(such as the parlamentarie: Bordignon and Ceccarini 2014: 55), can be seen as a way to support 
web-based participation. 
 
Finally, with reference to the symbolic dimension, there is a clear definition of what ‘them’ is 
whereas the notion of ‘us’ remains quite vague. The main identification of ‘us’ is Italy (18 
times), the ‘nation’ (14 times), and the FSM is linked to the 12 times the term ‘movement’ 
appears in the document analysis, whereas the notions of ‘community’, ‘people’ and ‘citizens’ 
are strongly associated to those who need to ‘resist’ to ‘them’ (the European Central Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the EU, other Italian parties, Germany, 
international financial actors, neoliberals).  
 
Considering the same dimensions (material, political and symbolic components of inclusionary 
populism) from a qualitative perspective, we analyse the most important speeches of Grillo 
(the New Year speeches, which explicitly are meant to be antagonistic to the traditional 
speeches of the president of the Republic and started in 2005, the year the blog was launched).  
 
In the 31 December 2010 speech a strong anti-establishment tone comes up front, the whole 
second part of the speech been against the Palazzo, the palace, where all the politicians are:  
 
The palace will sink, no doubt about this. […] This political class has failed and 
has to go away before it gets too late. Citizens need to auto-organize themselves 
as it was the case after the fall of fascism […]. The Five Star Movement […] is 
an opportunity for change, enabling the entrance of the citizen as such into 
politics. (Grillo 2010) 
 
Again, here is the notion of ordinary citizens (‘we’) against the ‘palace’ (‘them’). Quite 
interestingly, very rarely (if ever) does the notion of ‘people’ come into the speeches by Grillo: 
an individualized notion, citizen, and a collective notion, citizens, lies at the heart of the rhetoric 
of the leader of the FSM.  
 
The 31 December 2013 post, written after the great success in the 2013 national 
elections, is even clearer in terms of the overcoming of representative democracy and 
the identification of a set of enemies:  ‘The FSM is your last chance […]. We are you. 
We have everyone against us […]. Parties, newspapers, banks, tv, freemasonry, the 
ECB, lobbies’ (Grillo 2013). 
 
Of particular interest for both the material and symbolic dimension is the 2016 
New Year speech, which is entitled ‘Good 2017 by Beppe Grillo: It will be the year of 
the Italian pride’. In the speech there is a direct reference to the relevance of the basic 
income, which is introduced after a brief discussion of the risks of a society where 
people will work less and less (Grillo, 2016). Later in the speech, Grillo advocated 
‘Italian pride’ by stating: ‘We need to be proud to be the best, be proud because Italians 
are the best. We need to be proud because the Made in Italy [in English] appeals to the 
entire world. […] We are Italians, and I want to shout it for the first time. […] We are 
the best, and will prove it’ (Grillo 2016). 
 
The New Year speeches indicate support for an expanded form of welfare (via the minimum 
income scheme), the support for more participatory forms of democracy and the overcoming 
of the distinction between us (the ‘citizens’) and the politicians, against ‘them’ (banks, 
newspapers, other political parties, etc.).  
 
In sum, the FSM seems to have a limited number of inclusionary traits. With respect to all the 
dimensions, both the New Year’s speeches and the electoral manifestos demonstrate very 
limited signs of inclusion towards categories which go beyond ‘nationals’ and ‘Italians’. 
Although the speeches put an emphasis on direct democracy and expansionary forms of 
welfare, these elements are strongly associated with ‘the people’ who share the language – 
Italian – and who are therefore seen as citizens. No direct mention is made of immigrants or 
marginalized people in inclusionary terms. 
 
Podemos 
Podemos emerged following the various social mobilizations that channelled the Spanish 
society’s resentment towards austerity policies and the political regime in a context of deep 
economic recession, distrust of political institutions and crisis of representation (Alonso and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Bosch and Durán 2019; Kioupkiolis 2016; Sanders et al. 2017). 
Certainly, many of Podemos’s founders had actively participated in the Indignados/15M 
protests in 2011 against cutbacks in social services, increasing poverty and political corruption, 
and had long-standing experience of political activism in associative movements and radical 
left-wing parties. Formally, Podemos was created in January 2014 as a citizen movement 
reacting against traditional political parties and mainstream politics, with the aim of launching 
a popular candidacy for the European Parliament election. Shortly after, Podemos was 
transformed into a political party. Against all predictions, Podemos obtained roughly 8% of the 
Spanish votes in the European election, thus becoming the fourth political force at the time. In 
the 2015 general election, Podemos and its regional, left-wing allies in Catalonia, Galicia and 
Valencia obtained 20.6% of the vote and became the third parliamentary political force. In the 
2016 general election, Podemos, this time in coalition with the left-wing party Izquierda Unida 
and the regional alliances, reached 21% of the vote and remained as the third party in 
parliament (see Appendix B). 
 
Podemos has commonly been portrayed as a populist party, combining anti-elitist claims with 
a left-wing discourse (De Cleen et al. 2018; Kioupkiolis 2016). Regarding the question of 
inclusionary populism, our quantitative analysis shows that Podemos’s manifestos promote the 
inclusion of the main outgroups identified in our study, with a preponderance of women and 
workers, followed by the poor, immigrants, young people, disabled people and the 
unemployed. On the other hand, taking the three main dimensions of inclusionary populism 
together, ‘welfare’, ‘rights’ and ‘participation’ are the keywords most often employed. In 
particular, ‘welfare’ and ‘rights’ receive the highest counts in all three manifestos in relation to 
the material dimension, with the keywords ‘equality’, ‘justice’, ‘universal’ and ‘solidarity’ also 
appearing a considerable number of times. With regard to the political dimension, 
‘participation’ is by far the most mentioned keyword in national manifestos, followed by 
‘democracy’ and ‘representation’. Other than this, references to specific instruments of direct 
democracy such as ‘referendum’ and ‘assembly’ are far less frequent. Finally, in all three 
manifestos, keywords related to the symbolic dimension are less frequent than the material and 
political ones. ‘Dignity’ and ‘people’ are among the most frequent ones, followed by ‘identity’ 
and ‘self-determination’. 
 
Results from the qualitative discourse analysis go in line with the ones from the quantitative 
one. Content analysis of Podemos’s manifestos reveals that the associations between outgroups 
and the three dimensions of populism present inclusionary features. Podemos adopts a vision 
of society in which different groups – for instance workers, the youth and immigrants – are 
considered to be victims of dominating political and economic elites. At the same time, the 
party emphasizes the necessity to safeguard universal welfare rights encompassing outgroups, 
which is equated with the fulfilment of human rights. As a way of an example, the national 
election manifestos promote taking measures to guarantee universal access to education and 
healthcare, the right to work and the right to have a taxation system that is fair for middle 
classes and workers. Explicit mention is made of the extension of universal healthcare coverage 
to the immigrant population. In addition to manifestos, a core element of inclusionary populism 
– that is, the assurance of a universal rights system encompassing the deprived segments of 
society – is reflected in several of Iglesias’s speeches. The one given in Puerta del Sol in 
October 2015 serves as illustration: 
 
We seriously dream of a country where those who have been forced to leave 
can get a return ticket; a country where those who want to move ahead with a 
project may do so without having to depend on banks; a country where access 
to housing does not become a life sentence; a country where starvation wages 
disappear; a country where policies protect from exclusion and poverty. 
(Iglesias 2015) 
 
Concerning the political dimension, ‘participation’, ‘representation’ and ‘democracy’, which 
are the most frequently used terms related to the political dimension in electoral manifestos, 
are often employed to affirm outgroups’ political rights. Political participation and 
representation of outgroups in the political process are associated with the notions of human 
dignity and democratic quality. As an illustration, national election manifestos propose cultural 
activities promoting the participation of immigrant, Roma or disabled women in public life, 
ensuring equality of opportunities for children and teenagers as well as workers’ participation 
in the management of large companies. In the case of immigrants, there is a clear argument in 
favour of improving their political rights. Key measures include the closure of detention centres 
for immigrants, the reduction of deadlines to acquire Spanish nationality, the flexibilization of 
residence permits and family reunification processes, as well as the recognition of voting rights 
to settled foreign residents. In a speech given in Puerta del Sol in 2015, Iglesias referred to the 
immigrant population in the following terms: ‘Those migrant workers: nobody has the right to 
call them foreigners in Spain’ (Iglesias 2015). 
 
As regards the symbolic dimension, workers, dependants, the poor and the evicted are the main 
outgroups for which the manifestos propose the adoption of measures ensuring decent living 
conditions. Self-affirmation of Southern countries in the European context is explicit in the 
2014 Euromanifesto, which criticizes ‘those who have built the neoliberal and antidemocratic 
Europe’ and proposes a revision of the Lisbon Treaty. While these concerns are hardly explicit 
in national election manifestos, a vision of society in which Southern countries are presented 
as the victims of the European political and economic elites is recurrent in party speeches. In 
the one given for the election of the president of the European Parliament, in July 2014, Iglesias 
stated that: ‘In peripheral Europe the situation is tragic: our countries have almost become 
protectorates, new colonies, where powers that no one has elected are destroying social rights 
and threatening social and political cohesion in our societies’ (Iglesias 2014). 
 
To sum up, Podemos’s populism can be depicted as highly inclusionary. It advocates for the 
expansion of material and political rights to key outgroups, whereas the symbolic dimension 
of inclusionary populism is less explicit in the party discourse. 
 
 
Varieties of inclusionary populism in Southern Europe 
This section engages in a comparative examination of each of the three dimensions of 
inclusionary populism across our cases, based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses 
conducted. It highlights variation and identifies the dimension/s along which it occurs.  
  
As a starting point, and focusing on national elections, it can be argued that there is a 
pronounced difference between SYRIZA’s and Podemos’s explicit references to a wide range 
of similar outgroups – that is, groups that profit disproportionately less from the common 
resources and benefits that are up for distribution among ‘the people’ or are altogether excluded 
from that distribution – and the FSM’s limited reference to one group only. In particular, the 
workers, women, the unemployed, the young, the poor, immigrants and disabled people are the 
groups most frequently mentioned by SYRIZA and Podemos. The FSM, on the contrary, only 
makes specific reference to young people. This means outright that there is much less clarity 
with regard to the FSM’s position on the inclusionary-exclusionary continuum than there is 
with regard to the position of SYRIZA and Podemos. Exactly where SYRIZA and Podemos 
(and the FSM, to the extent that a position can be detected) lie on that continuum can be 
examined by looking at the three dimensions of populism: material, political and symbolic (see 
Table 2).  
 
 
 
Table 2. Share of keywords in election manifestos (*1000) 
 2012 2013 2014 (EP) 2015 2016 
SYRIZA           
  material 21.4  11.1 4.9  
  political 11.7  12 4.5  
  symbolic 6.1  3.8 1.9  
total 39.3  26.9 11.3  
FSM      
  material  1.6 1.2   
  political  6.4 2.2   
  symbolic  4.8 11.8   
total  12.8 15.2   
Podemos      
  material   16.8 10.9 10.8 
  political   6.6 4.8 4.8 
  symbolic   2.4 1.2 1.2 
total   25.7 16.9 16.9 
Source: Parties’ manifestos. 
 
 
In terms of the material dimension, significant variation is observed between the three cases. 
More specifically, the emphasis on rights and equality by SYRIZA and Podemos is much 
stronger than that placed on these values by the FSM. The latter makes some reference to rights 
and universality but little reference to any of the other terms in our dictionary. What is more, 
in the qualitative analysis it becomes clear that SYRIZA and Podemos put forward a 
left/egalitarian and universalist welfare programme that aims to widen the range of income 
supplements, unemployment insurance, healthcare and social benefits and extend redistribution 
to all outgroups. Conversely, while the FSM declares that it would like to see greater 
redistribution via a universal income scheme, it describes the eligibility for that scheme in terms 
of nation (Italians) or class (the middle classes) without explicitly differentiating among 
included or excluded groups. Welfare expansionism can be considered to be at the very core of 
inclusionary populism in the same way that welfare chauvinism clearly demarcates 
exclusionary populism. While SYRIZA and Podemos are clearly inclusionary populist parties, 
the FSM can be considered in more ambiguous terms.  
 
The findings also suggest that there is an overall lower level of salience of the political 
dimension as seen in party manifestos compared to the material one, especially for Podemos 
and for SYRIZA in the 2012 election. In particular, while all three parties refer to participation 
as a valuable principle that should be encouraged, there are different emphases in the terms the 
three parties prefer to use in order to highlight how citizens should participate. SYRIZA and 
Podemos for instance highlight democracy while the FSM does not. SYRIZA frequently refers 
to protest, which is not the case for the other two parties. Where SYRIZA and Podemos 
emphasize representative forms of democracy and compatible forms of political participation 
such as elections and parliament, the FSM does not. This variation is not only confirmed but 
made more specific by the qualitative analysis. When it comes to the political dimension, 
SYRIZA stresses social movements and the parliamentary arena; Podemos is keen on direct 
democracy as well as social media; and the FSM promotes digital forms of citizen participation. 
Again, SYRIZA and Podemos both call for the full inclusion of outgroups in the political 
process, while the FSM is less specific, with the exception of youth, who are called to take their 
future into their own hands. From this point of view, SYRIZA and Podemos can again be 
characterized as inclusionary populist political parties while this is less clear for the FSM. The 
latter will not be considered exclusionary populist since it does not explicitly aim to exclude 
particular groups from political participation – a practice it holds dear. However, it may not be 
considered inclusionary either, since it does not mention particular outgroups in its programme 
of extending political participation.  
 
The symbolic dimension is the most salient one for the FSM but the least relevant for SYRIZA 
and Podemos, as shown in Table 2. The FSM strongly emphasizes the idea of the nation and 
the idea of ‘community’, whereas Podemos makes some reference to the notion of identity. A 
patriotic tone is often struck both by SYRIZA, as seen in Alexis Tsipras’s speeches, and by the 
leader of the FSM. The difference between the two parties is that the FSM does not specify 
whether or not outgroups are to be included in the ‘community’, defined primarily in national 
terms, while SYRIZA’s more implicit national construction of community includes  references 
that indicate the desire to include or integrate outgroups such as immigrants. ‘Dignity’ is a core 
value for SYRIZA and Podemos but it is not mentioned by the FSM. Interestingly, adding to 
recent research on ‘transnational populism’ (Moffitt 2017), we find that it is not just the FSM, 
but all three parties that make some reference to Southern Europe, signifying their opposition 
to the drift that the economic crisis opened in the continent, placing the South in a position of 
subordination with respect to the North – and Germany in particular. This idea is endorsed by 
Podemos’s manifesto for the 2014 European election but is subsequently downplayed in the 
general election discourse.  
 
Finally, data on the European election allow us to refine our findings. As shown in Table 2, 
both SYRIZA and the FSM change the emphasis given to the different dimensions of 
inclusionary populism depending on whether they concur for national or European elections. 
By contrast, Podemos is more consistent on the weight given to each issue across election 
types. Second, we also observe cross-party variations as regards the dimension of inclusionary 
populism emphasized in the European election: Podemos clearly prioritizes the material 
dimension, the FSM stresses the symbolic one while the material and political dimensions are 
equally important for SYRIZA. Overall, the analysis of the European election manifestos 
allows us to better identify variations in the ways the three parties under study incorporate 
inclusionary features. 
 
Overall, among our three cases, SYRIZA and Podemos are clearly inclusionary along the 
material and political dimensions, although less explicitly inclusionary along the symbolic one. 
The FSM remains the most ambiguous of the three cases as it does not specify outgroups in 
general or refer to immigrants in particular, in contrast to both SYRIZA and Podemos, which 
are clearer in this respect. This finding is particularly relevant since it confirms one of the core 
arguments in the literature on populism type which states that a dichotomic reasoning does not 
help but rather that individual cases of populism should be considered in terms of a continuum 
between the inclusionary and exclusionary categories.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This study has made a twofold contribution. In empirical terms we have put forward new 
evidence on the three most successful inclusionary populist parties to emerge in Southern 
Europe in the aftermath of the economic crisis: SYRIZA, the FSM and Podemos. The electoral 
success of these parties has led to significant change in established European party systems and 
highlights the emergence and dissemination of the inclusionary populist phenomenon across 
the world’s regions.  
 
In theoretical terms, having applied the framework of inclusionary populism to another part of 
the world, beyond Latin America, we have demonstrated its wider usefulness and potential for 
comparative research. Broadly speaking, especially in comparative terms, the distinction 
between inclusionary and exclusionary seems more focused and less ambiguous with respect 
to the notion of left and right – quite different in its national variants. Furthermore, once 
populism is defined as ‘thin-centred populism’, it would seem quite difficult to add 
specifications which are strongly linked to ‘hard’ ideologies such as left and right. 
Theoretically, the various dimensions of analysis (symbolic, political and material) capture the 
most important elements of populism, rather than the classic economic and cultural left–right 
notions (as applied, for example, by Inglehart and Norris, 2016).  
In addition, in identifying significant variation among our three cases, not only in terms of 
degree (Caiani and Graziano 2016), but also in terms of substantive characteristics, we qualify 
and add nuance to a debate that assumes populist parties to be either inclusionary or 
exclusionary (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Furthermore, our study contributes to theoretical 
debates on inclusionary populism as the findings contradict Mudde’s (2004) homogeneous 
image of ‘the people’, adding to recent research emphasizing heterogeneity and plurality 
(Katsambekis 2016, Kioupkiolis 2016). Interestingly, our findings suggest that heterogeneity 
is framed differently in different parties. While SYRIZA and Podemos explicitly emphasize 
the inclusion of a wide array of similar outgroups, FSM only refers to one group. While 
debatable, as both an individual and a collective notion of the people are central in FSM’s 
rhetoric, claims of homogeneity would also seem less consistent. 
Our findings allow us to put forward some tentative ideas regarding the factors that could 
explain variation and suggest some potential research hypotheses that could inform larger 
comparative studies of inclusionary populism in future research. First, it seems that some 
populist parties make clear references to outgroups, such as SYRIZA and Podemos, while 
others, such as the FSM, less so. We might expect that the closer to ideological extremes, the 
clearer a populist party’s position can be expected to be on the question of inclusion. Second, 
the material dimension is much more strongly prioritized by the two parties that lean towards 
the left of the ideological continuum, SYRIZA and Podemos. This would perhaps indicate that 
the closer a populist party is to the left of the ideological continuum, the greater its attention to 
material issues. Third, the articulation of the cultural unit to which the three populist parties 
address their appeal along the symbolic dimension differ, with some attributing greater 
importance to the nation and some not. We might expect this element to differ according to 
each party’s legacy. Furthermore, the three parties’ appeal to intra-European North–South 
inequalities reveals a claim to equal respect among nations that belong to the same cultural 
entity. It differs from the anti-colonialist discourses that characterize Latin American populism 
along the symbolic dimension which highlight a claim to equal respect that appeals to an 
external aggressor who does not belong to the same cultural entity. Hence, it could be expected 
that the way the symbolic elements of inclusionary populism are defined will be determined by 
historical factors and will be likely to differ between nations and across the world’s regions. 
 
Finally, our findings are relevant with respect to the ongoing research on populism for a number 
of reasons. First, although we do not focus on the determinants of populism and therefore our 
article is not testing specific hypotheses, it sheds new light on how current analytical lenses 
could be used. Second, it provides evidence of the different nature of Southern European 
populism which has so far not been done in a comparative perspective. Third, it shows how 
inclusionary and exclusionary populism – although very promising analytically – should be 
considered as opposite poles of a continuum rather than different categories of populism. Our 
research shows that, if properly operationalized, the gradational (and not binary, vis-à-vis 
exclusionary) use of the inclusionary populism concept may be very useful to capture specific 
features of new populist parties, whereas in other cases greater ambiguity may be found (as in 
the case of the FSM) and therefore it may be considered as sharing a few exclusionary and 
inclusionary traits and therefore being difficult to classify. 
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1 We would like to thank a reviewer for pointing out at this potential additional contribution of our study. 
2 Note that the 2015 and 2016 manifestos are almost identical in size and content, as the respective elections 
were held about six months apart. We have decided to include them both to illustrate that the three dimensions 
of populism remain unaltered along the two elections. 
3  While we cover a small number of texts, we reject performing more interpretivist approaches such as holistic 
grading (Hawkins 2009). First, the study is not focused on identifying or measuring populism, but on whether 
the populist discourse is of an inclusionary nature. Word counts are a first step for identifying and qualifying the 
associations between outgroups and the three inclusionary dimensions of inclusionary populism.  Second, an 
automated word count combined with a content analysis of manifestos and speeches, rather than focusing on the 
tone or style of the manifesto as a whole, allows the topic under examination to be addressed better and yields 
sufficiently reliable results. 
4 We opted for the automated word count of the English version of SYRIZA manifesto as the software we 
employed, Yoshikoder, does not accept Greek characters. 
5 Podemos’s manifestos for the general elections contain around 52,500 words (annexes not included), 
compared to approximately 2,600 for SYRIZA and 2,400 for the FSM. For the European election, the word 
count is: around 9,700 for Podemos, approximately 5,300 for SYRIZA and roughly 3,200 for the FSM. 
                                                 
 
 
References 
Adcock, R. and Collier, D. (2001), Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative 
and Quantitative Research. American Political Science Review 25(3): 529-546. 
Akkerman, A., Mudde, C. and Zaslove, A. (2013) How Populist Are the People? Measuring 
Populist Attitudes in Voters. Comparative Political Studies 47(9): 1324-1453. 
Alonso, S. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2015) Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right? 
Southern European Society and Politics 20(1): 21-45. 
Aslanidis, P. (2018), Measuring populist discourse with semantic text analysis: an application 
on grassroots populist mobilization, Quality & Quantity 52(3): 1241-1263. 
Bale, T. and Allern, E. H. (2012) Political parties and interest groups: disentangling complex 
relationships. Party Politics 18(1): 7–25. 
Bonikowski, B. and Gidron, N. (2016), The populist style in American politics: presidential 
Campaign discourse, 1952–1996. Social Forces 94(4): 1593–1621. 
Bordignon, F. and Ceccarini, L. (2014) Protest and project, leader and party: The Normalisation 
of the Five Star Movement. Contemporary Italian Politics 6(12): 54-72. 
Bornschier, S. (2010) Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right. The New Cultural Conflict in 
Western Europe (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). 
Bosch, A. and Durán, I. (2019) How does economic crisis impel emerging parties on the road 
to elections? The case of the Spanish Podemos and Ciudadanos. Party Politics 25(2), 
252–267. 
Caiani, M. and Graziano, P.R. (2016) Varieties of Populism: insights from the Italian case. 
Italian Political Science Review 46(2): 243-267. 
De Cleen, B. (2017) Populism and nationalism, in Kaltwasser, C.R., Taggart, P., Espejo, P.O. 
& Ostiguy, P. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press): 342-362. 
De Cleen, Benjamin, Glynos, J. and Mondon, A. (2018) Critical Research on Populism: Nine 
Rules of Engagement, Organization 25(5), 649–661.  
Filc, D. (2010) The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism (London: 
Routledge). 
Filc, D. (2015) Latin American Inclusive and European Exclusionary Populism: Colonialism 
as an Explanation. Journal of Political Ideologies 20(3): 263-283. 
Errejon, I. and Mouffe, C. (2016) Podemos: In the Name of the People (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart). 
Grimmer, J. and Stewart, B.M. (2013) Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic 
Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts. Political Analysis 21(3): 267-297. 
Hanley, S. and Sikk, A. (2014) Economy, corruption or floating voters? Explaining the 
breakthroughs of Anti-Establishment Reform Parties in Eastern Europe. Party 
Politics 22(4): 522-33. 
Hawkins, K.A. (2009). Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative 
Perspective. Comparative Political Studies 42(8): 1040-1067. 
Iglesias, P. (2015) Understanding Podemos. New Left Review 93: 7-22. 
Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2016), Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-
Nots and Cultural Backlash, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP16-026. 
Judis, J.B. (2017) The populist explosion. How the Great Recession Transformed American 
and European Politics (New York: Columbia Global Reports). 
Katsambekis, G. (2016) Radical Left Populism in Contemporary Greece: Syriza's Trajectory 
from Minoritarian Opposition to Power. Constellations 23(3): pp. 391-403. 
Katz, R.S. and Mair, P. (1995) Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: 
The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics 1(1): 5–28 
Keith, D. and McGowan, F. (2016) The Radical Left and immigration: resilient or 
acquiescent in the face of the radical right? In: March L and Keith D (ed.) Europe’s 
Radical Left: From Marginality to the Mainstream? (London: Rowman and 
Littlefield): 89-112. 
Kioupkiolis, A. (2016) Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in 
contemporary Spain. Journal of Political Ideologies 21(2): 99-120. 
Kitschelt, H. (1997) The radical right in Western Europe. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Kriesi, H. (2014) The Populist Challenge. West European Politics 37(2): 361-378 
Kriesi, H. and Pappas, T.S. (ed) (2015). European Populism in the Shadow of the Great 
Recession. Colchester: ECPR Press 
Laclau, E (1977) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism. 
London: New Left Books. 
Lanzone, M.E. and Woods, D. (2015), Riding the Populist Web: contextualizing the Five Star 
Movement (M5S) in Italy. Politics and Governance, 3(2): 54-64. 
Laver, M., Benoit, K. and Garry, J. (2003) Estimating policy positions from political texts. 
American Journal of Political Science 44(3): 619–634. 
Lowe, W. and Benoit, K. (2013). Validating Estimates of Latent Traits from Textual Data 
Using Human Judgment as a Benchmark. Political Analysis 21(3): 298-313. 
March, L. (2011) Radical Left Parties in Europe. London: Routledge. 
March, L. and Mudde, C. (2005) What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left 
After 1989: Decline and Mutation. Comparative European Politics 3(1): 23-49. 
Margulies, W. B. (2014) The future of the liberal party family: a survey of new liberal parties 
and other trends. Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica 44(2): pp. 267-98. 
Moffitt, B. (2017) ‘Transnational Populism? Representative Claims, Media and the Difficulty 
of Constructing a Transnational “People”. Javnost-The Public, 24(4): 409-425. 
Mouffe, C. (2018) For a Left Populism. London: Verso.  
Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (ed) (2012). Populism in Europe and the Americas: 
Threat or Corrective for Democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mudde C (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39, 542–563.  
Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2013) Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: 
Comparing the Contemporary Europe and Latin America. Government and 
Opposition 48(2): 147-174. 
Norris, P. (2005) Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ostiguy, P. (2017) Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach, in Kaltwasser, C.R., Taggart, P., 
Espejo, P.O. and Ostiguy, P. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 73-97. 
Passarelli, G. and Tuorto, D. (2018) ‘Five Star Movement: Purely a matter of Protest? The rise 
of a new party between political discontent and reasoned voting’. Party Politics 24(2), 
129–140. 
Pauwels, T. (2011) Measuring Populism: A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in 
Belgium’. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 21(1): 97–119. 
Poguntke, T. and Scarrow, S.E. (1996) The politics of anti-party sentiment: Introduction. 
European Journal of Political Research 29(3): 257–262. 
Polk, J., Rovny, J., Bakker., R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L., Jolly, S., Koedam, J., Kostelka, F., 
Marks, M., Schumacher, G., Steenbergen, M., Vachudova, M. and Zilovic, M. (2017) 
Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political 
parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data. Research & Politics 
4(1): 1-9. 
Ramiro, L. and Gómez, R. (2017) Radical-left populism during the great recession: Podemos 
and its competition with the established radical left’. Political Studies 65(1S): 108-126. 
Rodríguez-Teruel, J., Barrio, A. and Barberà, O. (2017) ‘Fast and Furious: Podemos’ Quest for 
Power in Multi-level Spain’, South European Society and Politics 21 (4): 561-585. 
Rooduijn, M. and Pauwels, T. (2011) Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of 
Content Analysis. West European Politics 34(6): 1272-1238. 
Salgado, S. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2018) Introduction: populist discourses and political 
communication in Southern Europe’, European Political Science, published early 
online, February, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0139-2. 
Sanders, K., Molina Hurtado, M.J. and Zoragastua, J. (2017), ‘Populism and exclusionary 
narratives: The ‘’other’’ in Podemos’ 2014 European Union election campaign’, 
European Journal of Communication 32(6): 522-567. 
Schoor, C. (2017), ‘In the theatre of political style: Touches of populism, pluralism and elitism 
in speeches of politicians’, Discourse & Society 28(6), 657–676. 
Slapin, J.B. and Proksch, S-O. (2008) A scaling model for estimating time-series party 
positions from texts. American Journal of Political Science. 52(3): 705–722. 
Stavrakakis, Y. (2017) Discourse theory in populism research, Journal of Language and 
Politics. 16(4): 523-534. 
Stavrakakis, Y. & Jäger, A. (2017) Accomplishments and limitations of the ‘new’ mainstream 
in contemporary populism studies, European Journal of Social Theory. 21(4): 547-565. 
Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G. (2014) Left-wing populism in the European periphery: 
the case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies 19(2): 119-142. 
Stavrakakis, Y., Katsambekis, G., Nikisianis, N., Kioupkiolis, A., & Siomos, T. (2017) 
Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: revisiting a reified association, Critical 
Discourse Studies. 14(4): 420-439. 
Tsakatika, M. (2016) SYRIZA’s Electoral Rise in Greece: Protest, Trust and the Art of Political 
Manipulation. South European Society and Politics 21(4): 519-540. 
Tsakatika, M. and Eleftheriou, C. (2013) The Radical Left's Turn towards Civil Society in 
Greece: One Strategy, Two Paths. South European Society and Politics 18(21): 81-99. 
Tsirbas, Y. (2015) The 2014 Local Elections in Greece: Looking for Patterns in a Changing 
Political System. South European Society and Politics 20(1): 133-155. 
van Biezen, I., Mair, P., and Poguntke, T. (2012) Going, going… gone? The Decline of Party 
Membership in Contemporary Europe’. European Journal of Political Research, 51(1): 
24-56. 
Verney, S. and Bosco, A. (2013) Living Parallel Lives: Italy and Greece in an Age of Austerity. 
South European Society and Politics 18(4): 397-426. 
 
Party documents 
Five Star Movement (2013). Un programma unico perché di tutti. Programma per le elezioni 
europee, www.beppegrillo.it/europee/programma. 
Five Star Movement (2014). In Europa per l’Italia. Programma M5S, 
www.beppegrillo.it/europee/programma. 
Podemos (2014). PODEMOS. Documento Final del Programa Colaborativo, 
http://blogs.elpais.com/files/programa-podemos.pdf. 
Podemos (2015). Queremos, Sabemos, Podemos. Elecciones Generales. 20 de Diciembre de 
2015, https://lasonrisadeunpais.es/wp-content/plugins/programa/data/programa-es.pdf. 
Podemos (2016). PODEMOS. 26J, https://lasonrisadeunpais.es/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Podemos-Programa-Electoral-Elecciones-Generales-26J.pdf. 
SYRIZA-United Social Front (2012) ‘They decided without us, we are proceeding without 
them’. Election manifesto, April–May, www.syn.gr/ekl2012/eklogikidiak2012.pdf. 
SYRIZA (2014) ‘For Radical change in Greece and the attainment of another Europe’, 
Manifesto for the 2014 European Elections, April 2014. Available at: left.gr/news/i-
diakiryxi-toy-syriza-gia-tis-eyroekloges. 
SYRIZA (2015) ‘Hope is on the Way. Greece is moving forward – Europe is changing. A 
Framework Government Programme’, Januarym www.syriza.gr/upload/60147_1.pdf. 
 
 
